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Abstract— Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are susceptible
to both insider and outsider attacks more than wired and base
station-based wireless networks. This is because of the lack of a
well-defined defense perimeter in MANETs, preventing the use
of defenses including firewalls or intrusion detection systems.
This lack of perimeter calls for implementation of security in a
distributed, collaborative manner.
We recently introduced a novel deny-by-default distributed
security policy enforcement architecture for MANETs by har-
nessing and extending the concept ofnetwork capabilities. The
deny-by-defaultprinciple allows compromised nodes to access
only authorized services, limiting their ability to disrupt or
even interfere with end-to-end connectivity and nodes beyond
their local communication radius. The enforcement of policies
is done hop-by-hop, in a distributed manner. In this paper we
present preliminary results evaluating our architecture. Through
simulation, we show that our solution incurs minimal overhead
in terms of network bandwidth and latency even in the presence
of cryptographic operations. Furthermore, we show that the
protection remains effective even in the presence of misbehaving
nodes and routing changes due to mobility. While further work
is needed to fully evaluate our scheme, we believe that the notion
of collaborative security in MANETs is a promising direction for
future research.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are increasingly em-
ployed in both military and commercial network situations
where fixed infrastructure is too costly or dangerous to deploy,
or has been rendered inoperable. MANETs are fundamentally
different from the Internet because all peers act as both sources
and routers using the other participants to relay packets to
their final destination. MANETs are susceptible to both insider
and outsider attacks. Even a small number of misbehaving
nodes can successfully render the entire MANET inoperable:
malicious peers can abuse the network exhausting all network
and power resources.
In traditional networks, malicious nodes and traffic are
kept away from a set of nodes belonging to an organization
or a group usingfirewalls. This is feasible because of the
existence of a well defined network perimeter. All incoming
and outgoing traffic needs to transit through these firewall
nodes, which enforce the policies at the perimeter. Within te
perimeter, smaller sub-groups can have more stringent policies
by deploying their own firewalls. Unfortunately, the concept of
a network perimeter does not exist in MANETs, and policies
need to be enforced in a distributed manner while taking into
consideration node mobility.
To address this, recently, we proposed a deny-by-default
architecture [3] that enforces trust relationships and traffic
accountability between mobile nodes through a distributed
policy enforcement scheme for MANETs. In that architecture,
we extended the network capability framework [4] and tailored
it to the resource-constrained MANET environment. A capa-
bility is a token of authority that has associated rights. The
capabilities propagate both access control rules and traffic-
shaping parameters that should govern a node’s traffic. In the
deny-by-default, model nodes can only access the services
and hosts they are authorized for by the capabilities given
to them. The enforcement of the capability is done in a
distributed manner by all the nodes in the path from the source
to the destination. Compromised or malicious nodes cannot
exceed their authority and expose the whole network to an
adversary. Upon detection, we can prevent a compromised
node from further attacking the network simply by revoking
its capabilities. Moreover, that architecture helps mitigate the
impact of denial of service (DoS) attacks because excess or
unauthorized packets are dropped closer to the attack source.
Thus, we avoid unnecessary data processing and forwarding
at the target node and the network itself.
In this paper, we provide a preliminary evaluation of such
a deny-by-default system using the GloMoSim [1] simulator.
Because GloMoSim does not include any packet checking
functionality, we added another layer between IP and the
AODV routing processing, where we implemented our pro-
tocols. Our primary concern in the evaluation is the network
overhead of our scheme given the cryptographic operations
required. Therefore, we focused our measurements on com-
paring the packet latency and bandwidth with and without
our system in a variety of mobility scenarios and topologies.
We show that the collaborative effort of enforcing the policies
provides strong security benefits without incurring much per-
formance overhead. We discovered that our scheme imposes
a 8% overhead on the end-to-end latency and a5% reduction
on available bandwidth. We believe that this is not a high price
to pay given that there are scenarios where a MANET becomes
completely unusable even when a single node misbehaves. We
also show that our system allocates the network resources in
a fair manner, even in the presence of misbehaving nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly
present the high level system architecture in Section II. We
evaluate our architecture through simulation, with results given
in Section III. Related work is discussed in Section IV.
Fig. 1. System overview
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In our architecture, one or more pre-defined nodes act as
a group controller (GC), which is trusted by all the group
nodes. A GC has authority to assign resources to the nodes in
MANET. This resource allocation is represented as a KeyNote-
style credential [5] (capability) calledpolicy token, and it can
be used to express the services and the bandwidth a node is
allowed to access. They are cryptographically signed by the
GC, which can be verified any node in the MANET.
When a node (initiator) requests a service from another
MANET node (responder) using the policy token assigned to
the initiator, the responder can provide a capability back to the
initiator. This is called anetwork capability, and it is generated
based on the resource policy assigned to the responder and its
dynamic conditions (e.g., level of utilization).
Figure 1 gives a brief overview of our system. All nodes in
the path between an initiator to a responder (i.e., nodes relay-
ing the packets) enforce and abide by the resource allocation
encoded by the GC in the policy token and the responder
in the network capability. The enforcement involves both
accessibility and bandwidth allocation. A responder accepts
packets (except for the first one) from an initiator only if
the initiator has authorization to send, in the form of a valid
network capability. It accepts the first packet only if the
initiator’s policy token is included. An intermediate nodewill
forward the packets from a node only if the packets have an
associated policy token or network capability, and if they do
not violate the conditions contained therein. Possession of a
network capability does not imply resource reservation; they
are the maximum limits a node can use. Available resources
are allocated by the intermediate nodes in a fair manner, in
proportion to the allocations defined in the policy token and
network capability.
The capability need not be contained in all packets. The first
packet carries the capability, along with a transaction idetifi r
(TXI) and a public key. Subsequent packets contain only the
TXI and a packet signature based on that public key. Interme-
diate nodes cache policy tokens and network capabilities ina
capability database, treating them as soft state. A capability
database entry contains the source and destination addresses,
TXI, the capability, public key for the packet signature and
packet statistics. Capability retransmissions update thesoft
state of intermediate nodes when the route changes due to node
mobility. The soft state after a route change is also updated
using an on-demand query for the capability database entry
from the up stream nodes.
III. S IMULATION RESULTS
We implemented our scheme in the GloMoSim simula-
tor [1]. To that end, we extended GloMoSim by develop-
ing an additional layer between the IP and AODV routing
layer [10]. Here, we compare the performance of capability-
based MANETs (referred to ascaprt) with a system that
does not use capabilities (referred to asoriginal). Note that
original is inherently vulnerable to a number of attacks,
including DoS and unauthorized access, which are not feasibl
in caprt. However, our experiments are aimed at quantifying
the performance impact of using our scheme, relative to an
unsecure MANET.
We conduct a number of experiments, of increasing com-
plexity in terms of topology and MANET parameters, in order
to build up our understanding of the system behavior. Initially,
we use a simple “line” topology, where seven nodes (numbered
0 through6) are arranged in a line 200 meters apart. We use
this simple topology for computing the basic overhead of our
scheme, since it is easy to analyze the results. We then measure
our system using more complex and realistic networks.
In our experiments, we keep the default radio parameters
of GloMoSim: radio range 376.782m and link bandwidth 2
Mbps. We use 802.11 as the MAC protocol. We introduce
a packet processing delay in both models. This is set to
0.01 milliseconds. This is the time required to process 128-
byte packets on a 100 Mbps link. To protect the integrity of
the capability tokens and verify the identity of the sender
and the receiver, we employ 256-bit RSA for signing the
individual data packets and 1024-bit RSA for signing the
capability itself. 256-bits are sufficient for very-short-lifetime
data packet signatures as we change this key periodically [3].
Headers related to our scheme introduce an additional 36
bytes per data packet; 4 bytes for the transaction identifier
d 32 bytes for the signature. Packets containing policy
tokens are always verified by the intermediate nodes since
they constitute relatively low traffic. However, to improve
the latency performance of our system, we chose to verify
data packets probabilistically (this can depend on the path
length). Upon detection of an unauthorized packet, we can
revert back to deterministic packet checking and isolate the
misbehaving node. The cost of all packet operations are
(per packet): inserting a capability token (identifier) in the
capability database costs an average of 0.01 milliseconds
and the record lookup operation costs 0.005 milliseconds. In
addition, generating a signature requires 0.168 milliseconds,
while verification takes 0.0275 milliseconds for data packets.
Network capabilities require 3.159ms for signature generation



























































Fig. 3. Average latency of 1000 CBR packets of size 512 bytes
packet is sent every 8 seconds. Simulations were run on a
Pentium-4 3.20GHz CPU with 1GB memory.
Each intermediate node verifies the signature of a packet
with probability 0.2063. Since this verification decision is
taken independently by each node, a signature of a packet
is verified by at least one node in a 3-hop path with prob-
ability 0.50 (i.e., 1-(1-0.2063)(1-0.2063)(1-0.2063)). The per-
formance overhead for a system in which the nodes verified
the signature of all the packets were also similar, since the
signature verification did not incur high overhead.
We implemented a token bucket algorithm to enforce the
bandwidth limitation at the intermediate nodes. This enables
us to limit both burst and average rate of the flow. Each of the
experiments was run 20 times with different seed values, and
the average of the parameter of interest was taken.
A. Packet latency
We compare the latency of packet processing incaprt with
that of original (also shown asorg in the figures)). We send
1000 packets of size 512 bytes at 100 ms intervals from a
source node to a destination noden hops away, wheren =
1, . . . 6 in the line topology. We measure the latency of the
packet as the time from the creation of packet in the source
node to the time it reaches the final destination.
The latency of the first packet is larger than the rest of















































Fig. 5. FTP throughput
in both schemes (caprt and original), and credentials need
to be established in our scheme. The packet processing for
the our scheme also includes capability database lookup and
probabilistic verification of packet signatures.
Figure 2 shows the latency for the first packet to reach the
different destination nodes. The higher latency in our scheme
is due to the credential establishment, capability database
lookup and signature verification, as well as the size overhead
(36 bytes) in the packet. This average overhead is 35.8ms,
41.6ms and 60.9ms respectively for nodes3, 4 and 5 hops
away. The average overhead is 20.5%. The overhead increases
as hop length increases since the overhead is added at each
node. It can also be seen that the latency increases considerably
from 3 hops to 4 hops in both schemes. This is an artifact
of using AODV as the underlying routing protocol, because
AODV had to increment the TTL once more and retransmit
the RREQ packet while finding the routes to the node that was
4 or 5 hops away. The same is true for 6 nodes.
Figure 3 shows the average latency for all 1000 packets
to reach their destination node, in each of the different
measurements (transmission to nodesn hops away, varying
n in each experiment). The effect of the high latency for the
first packet is amortized over a large number of packets. The
average overhead is only 0.6ms, 1.2ms and 1.6ms respectively
for nodes3, 4 and5 hops away. The average overhead is only






























Fig. 6. Number of packets received after a route change
B. Throughput
UDP throughput:We now compare the throughput ofcaprt
with that oforiginal on an 802.11-based MANET. We use the
line topology and pump large packets (1400 bytes) at high rate
(every 1ms). We set node 0 as the source of the CBR traffic
and send the traffic to destination nodes at different hops. We
measure the number of bytes received within one minute from
the start of the data transfer and compute the data throughput.
The results are shown in 4. As expected, the throughput in
both schemes decreases as the number of hops in the path
increases. The throughput of our scheme is only 2% lower
than the original (insecure) scheme.
TCP throughput: To measure the performance of TCP in
our scheme, we compare the throughput of FTP on both
schemes on a line topology. An FTP client at node 0 transfers
data to an FTP server at1, 2, . . . , 6 hops away. In each
experiment the client sends 10 application-layer items of
random sizes. The application layer item sent was the same for
both schemes in the same experiment. The results are plotted
in Figure 5. The behavior of TCP performance is similar to
that of CBR, but at lower bandwidth due to TCP congestion
control and in-order guaranteed delivery. On average, TCP
throughput for our scheme is5.3% lower than the original
(insecure) scheme.
C. Resilience to mobility
To verify the validity of our approach in a MANET envi-
ronment, we evaluate the effects of mobility on the capability
scheme. Since the nodes keep only soft state about the
capabilities, when the route changes due to node mobility, the
new node needs to receive the credentials (policy token and
network capability) for existing sessions.
Figure 6 shows the effect of mobility on the number of
packets received for various inter-packet intervals. In this
experiment, 1000 packets of 512 bytes were sent at a constant
rate to a node 3 hops away, starting at time 0. At time 0.5
seconds, the node 2 hops away was removed and a new node
introduced. Figure 6 shows the number of packets received at
the destination for both schemes (caprt andoriginal), with and




























Fig. 7. Packet delivery ratio for unicast CBR traffic at various mobility
speeds
3-93 6-96 30-39 60-69
FTP
Original 16395 15546 14759 14694
Capability 14062 17722 14176 15147
CBR
Original 65711 162293 57535 177303
Capability 54113 148027 57793 148153
Ltd bw capability 129164 131437 129844 134230
CBR Original 74124 150718 52510 157779
Mobility Capability 59864 117728 57933 129347
Ltd bw capability 113111 136975 100924 138040
TABLE I
FTP AND CBR THROUGHPUT(BPS) ON A GRID TOPOLOGY
due to mobility increases at lower inter-packet interval. On
average, our scheme drops 155ms worth of traffic, whereas
the original scheme drops 108ms worth of traffic. This higher
loss is due to the need for propagating the network capability
to the new node.
D. Larger topology
Next, we evalute our system in the context of a larger and
more complex topology, and in the presence of mobility.
Grid Topology: We use a grid topology containing 100
nodes (10x10 grid), each node 300m apart. We ran four FTP
sessions, two of them from nodes on the top of the grid to
nodes on the bottom of the grid; specifically, between node
pairs(3, 93) and(6, 96). The other two FTP session were from
left to right, between node pairs(30, 39) and(60, 69). We also
ran traffic of 1400 bytes with 10ms inter-packet interval for
ose source-destination pairs and computed throughput.
Table I shows the average throughput of the four sessions,
for both FTP and CBR. The average throughput ofcaprt and
original is comparable. Our scheme’s throughput is only0.5%
lower for FTP and11.8% lower for CBR.
The CBR experiment in the table contains 3 rows. The
original scheme does not limit the bandwidth a node can use.
Our scheme in the second row allowed nodes to use unlimited
bandwidth. In both cases, two of the sessions get most of
the bandwidth. In the third experiment, the network capability
permitted limited bandwidth. In this case, each of the session
received a fair share of the available bandwidth.
4
























































Fig. 9. Limiting bandwidth of misbehaving nodes
The last set of rows shows the effect of mobility in both
schemes. In this set of experiments, the second node in the
route from source to destination of all the traffic pairs was
removed 2 seconds after the experiment began. The average
throughput ofcaprt was16.1% less than the original scheme.
This reduction is more than the CBR traffic without mobility.
This is because the our scheme needs more time to recover,
due to the need for restoring the capability database in the new
route. The last row shows the results when the capability had
a limited bandwidth. Here the average bandwidth dropped by
6.8% compared tocaprt without mobility.
Random Topology:We placed50 nodes at random on a
terrain of1200s×1200 meters. There were five random source-
destination pairs that were sending CBR traffic of256 bytes
at a packet interval of either50ms or 25ms (i.e., data rate of
40kbps and80kbps respectively). In each experiment, all the
nodes were mobile with a constant speed using theRandom
Waypointmodel. Each of the experiments was conducted 20
times using different seeds and the average was taken. Exper-
iments where the topology was partitioned were discarded.
Figure 7 shows the packet delivery ratio (PDR) for both
schemes at various mobility speeds. On average, the PDR for
caprt was only1.6% and 9.14% lower than fororiginal, for
50ms and25ms inter-packet interval respectively.
E. Resilience against misbehaving nodes
Another important characteristic is the system’s behavior
in the presence of malicious or misbehaving nodes. To that
end, we study the attack resilience of the our protocol. The
topology for this experiment is shown in Figure 8. There are
three source nodesS1, S2 andS3 sending traffic to respective
destination nodesD1, D2 and D3. The traffic is CBR with
packets of size 512 bytes, sent at packet intervals 40ms, 20ms
and 10ms, originating respectively fromS1, S2 andS3. All the
nodes are allocated the same bandwidth. Even though all the
source nodes have the ability to send to their destination, they
try to send more than they are allowed. The nodeS3 is the
most misbehaving and the nodeS1 is the least. The network
tries to limit the flow to their capability.
The results are shown in Figure 9. Even thoughS3 − D3
traffic is four times theS1 − D1 traffic and two times the
S2−D2 traffic, each of them gets the same bandwidth initially.
Any increase in the allocated bandwidth after reaching the rat
of S1 − D1 gives the same increase for the other two flows.
Once the allocated bandwidth reaches the rate ofS2 − D2
traffic, S3−D3 bandwidth increases to its full rate. We see that
the number of bytes received is slightly less than the allocated
bandwidth since the IP, UDP andcaprtheaders are not counted
as part of the bytes received.
IV. RELATED WORK
The concept of capabilities was used in operating system
for securing resources [11]. Follow-on work investigated the
controlled exposure of resources at the network layer usingthe
concept of “visas” for packets [6], which is similar to network
capabilities. More recently, network capabilities were proposed
to prevent DoS in wired networks [4]. We extend the concept
to MANET and use it for both access control rules and traffic
shaping parameters [3]. Previous work on distributed firewalls
[7] focused on wired fixed-network environments, attempting
to protect only end-hosts, using a host-based solution.
Signing and verification of packets between a sender and a
receiver were commercially available in early 1990s. Novell’s
Netware 3.11 and 4.x supportedNCP Packet Signature Option,
where a unique signature was appended to each packet sent
between the client and the server [9]. Mitigating DoS attacks
by including a message authentication code and the certificate
of the sender for each packet has been previously proposed
[12]. That work does not study the high overhead associated
with sending a large signature or a large certificate on each
packet. The authors use game theory to study the problem
of dealing with selfish nodes that do not verify the packet
signatures, using incentives and punishments. This mechanism
or any other reputation based mechanism [8] can also be used
in our scheme to deal with selfish nodes.
HEAP [2] mitigates various MANET attacks from outsider
nodes by doing a hop-by-hop packet authentication using
HMAC. MACs (end-to-end or hop-by-hop) cannot deal with
insider attacks. They also cannot provide access control unless
different MAC keys are used for different policies. MACs
allow rogue nodes to “hide” since MACs are repudiable as
all the intermediate nodes in the path between a sender and a
r ceiver need to know the key. Only public key mechanisms
allow packet source validation by all intermediate nodes.
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V. CONCLUSIONS ANDFUTURE WORK
We evaluated a novel deny-by-default architecture for en-
forcing security policies in MANETs. The architecture based
on the concept of network capabilities, can protect both end-
host resources and network bandwidth from denial of service
attacks, as well as limit the exposure of the MANET to
compromised and malicious nodes. We show that the impact of
the scheme is minimal on throughput and latency, in spite of
using cryptographic operations, and the scheme can recover
well on route changes due to mobility. We also show that
the scheme allocates resources in a fair manner even in the
presence of misbehaving nodes. For our future work, we plan
to implement and deploy on MANET test-beds with real
traffic. We plan to measure the performance impact and the
user experience with and without the presence of attackers.
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